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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Empowerment Zone programs consist of tax incentives in areas with a high 
unemployment level and a low density of locally-based firms. Tax deductions 
are granted to firms setting up in these areas and creating jobs locally. Follow-
ing the first experiments in the US (in the 1980s) or in the UK and France (in 
the 1990s), an important body of empirical literature has tested whether these 
programs have reached their objectives in terms of jobs or businesses creations 
and provided low evidence of significant direct effects stemming from locally-
targeted EZ programs. However, the purpose of these EZ programs was often 
not limited to the local labor market. In France, the policies were extended to 
subsidies for local home ownership and social housing landlords, as well as to 
the development of public amenities. In the US, the federal EZ program 
launched in 1994 also involved subsidies for social services and local amenities. 
These measures may thus have impacted the local housing market. 
Our goal is to extend the literature on the magnitude of EZ effect on local 
home prices. In the US, the number of studies focussing on the real estate con-
sequences of these locally-targeted programs is limited (see e.g., Engberg and 
Greenbaum, 1999, Busso and Kline, 2007, or Krupka and Noonan, 2009). Most 
of them provided evidence of a significantly positive, but moderate, effect on 
property values. To our knowledge, the only study in France is a companion 
paper (Gregoir and Maury, 2014) putting the emphasis on a very specific 
French administrative unit (the Seine-Saint-Denis département). We extend this 
analysis and focus on the inner Paris housing market. We use an integrated 
econometric setup, simultaneously assessing the possible effects of the local 
program within the boundaries of the EZ and beyond the limits of the EZ. We 
rely on a a street-by-street mapping of EZs. We estimate the spatial spillover 
effect with a semi-parametric distance-to-the-EZ-boundary gradient function. 
Consequently, we can test for the significance of the EZ impact on house price 
levels within targeted zones, as well as on house price gaps between units with-
in EZs and units in the vicinity of EZs, controlling for the distance between 
these two units. 
In France, the EZ programs were initiated at the end of 1996 (the Round I 
program hereafter). Three types of targeted zones were defined with a growing 
amount of tax exemptions: 750 ZUS (Zones Urbaines Sensibles), 416 ZRU 
(Zones de Redynamisation Urbaines), selected among the 750 ZUS) and 44 
ZFU (Zones Franches Urbaines) were selected and geographically-delimited 
among the most distressed ZUS. The concentration of targeted zones is relative-
ly high in inner Paris, with 9 newly created ZUS. We collect housing sales val-
ues, precise location and attributes in 1996 and 1997 (i.e., the year before and 
the year after the program implementation). We select all pre-reform (1996) 
sales observations within or in the vicinity of a ZUS. For each observation (the 
focal point), we construct a post-reform counterfactual (after the Round I im-
plementation), by selecting a fixed number of sales at the same location or an 
immediate proximity. We then construct the pre- and post- reform differences 
of the logarithms of house prices for each focal point within and beyond ZUS 
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borders. We proceed in the same manner for a selected control group of zones 
that did not become ZUSs in 1996, but could have become so, according to the 
public criteria based on some descriptive statistics. The log of price gaps (for 
treated ZUS or controls, within or beyond the considered zone) are pooled and a 
partially linear single-index model is estimated. Among the linear set of covari-
ates, we include the difference of the main house attributes of the reference and 
counterfactual observations. The non-parametric component (i.e., the single 
index) includes all other factors that may potentially interact in a non-linear 
manner: in particular, the way the distance to the closest EZ (or control) bound-
ary affects the log of house price differences is assessed with a non-linear link 
function  . modeled with a penalized spline (P-spline) (Yu and Ruppert 
(2002)). This type of spline offers an interesting trade-off between the flexibil-
ity of the functional form and the computational costs. 
We detect no significant effect of the EZ program on housing values in Par-
is, at least in the short run. This result is at odds with the companion contribu-
tion, Gregoir and Maury (2014), which detected a significantly negative effect 
of the EZ program in the Seine-Saint-Denis district. However, this study was 
based on a different period (Round II implementation in 2004) and another kind 
on EZ (i.e., second tier EZs converted into third tier EZs). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a survey of the lit-
erature on empowerment zones in France in the second section. In Section 3, we 
present the French EZ program and detail its implementation in Paris. We de-
scribe our dataset in the fourth section. Section 5 provides our detailed econo-
metric methodology: the spatial matching process, control group selection, the 
penalized spline estimation of the partially linear single index model. Section 6 
presents the results. The last section concludes. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE FRENCH PROGRAM 
 
In the beginning of 1997, the French authorities initiated the first Empower-
ment Zone program following experiments in the UK and the US. As said 
above, three categories of EZ have been created with a growing amount of pub-
lic aid: ZUS (first tier), ZRU (second tier) selected among the ZUS, and ZFU 
(third tier) selected among the most distressed ZUS. First tier EZs (i.e., ZUSs 
that are not ZRUs or ZFUs) may theoretically be exempt from local business 
and property taxes. It should be noted that such public grants are at the discre-
tion of local authorities and are not compensated by the central government. 
Moreover, local authorities (municipalities) with a first tier EZ must establish a 
local housing program as well as promote urban regeneration projects. House-
holds wishing to become homeowners in ZUSs benefit under certain conditions 
from substantial increases in the maximum amount of publicly funded zero-
interest rate loans (Prêt à Taux Zéro, PTZ) they are entitled to. Hence, even 
though aid for ZUSs is mainly focused on business creation and local employ-
ment (which can indirectly affect the housing market), aid may also impact on 
local urban projects (housing programs, local amenities) through enlarged in-
centives to conduct such projects for local authorities which benefit from this 
72 Stéphane Gregoir, Pierre-Tristan Maury 
support. Real estate values appear to be an ideal measure for assessing the effect 
of local ZUSs, since the wealth created by these programs should be capitalized 
in the local housing stock. 
Many descriptive studies have been published on the evaluation of different 
rounds of the French EZ program with contrasting conclusions (see Thélot, 
2004, Gilli, 2006, or Ernst, 2008). The two most significant statistical contribu-
tions are Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2010) and Givord, Rathelot and Sillard 
(2011). Gobillon et al. (2010) propose an assessment of the effects of the first 
round of the French EZ program. They use a two-stage procedure to estimate 
the impact of EZs on individual unemployment durations. First, they estimate a 
stratified partial likelihood estimator with a panel dataset at the municipality 
level, from 1993 to 2003. They obtain average municipal effects and illustrate 
the changes in these effects over time. Comparing these results for treated mu-
nicipalities (those including an EZ) and counterfactual municipalities with simi-
lar characteristics, they provide evidence of moderate but significant effects on 
the French program in the short run (i.e., for the semesters immediately follow-
ing the policy implementation). No significant effect is detected over larger 
horizons. Givord et al. (2011) evaluate the consequences of the Round II French 
EZ program on economic activity: business creations and employment. They 
use establishment level data from 2002 to 2007 with a geographic mapping 
methodology, in order to establish the exact street address. They investigate the 
impact of the program on treated areas (firms located with EZs boundaries) with 
a two stage method (propensity score to control the probability for an area be-
coming a ZFU, plus a kernel matching method). They find significant effects of 
the program on both business creation and employment. It should be noted that 
they also find evidence of negative spatial spillover effects on areas in the vicin-
ity of EZs. 
3. DATA 
 
Data on sales prices come from the Paris Chamber of Notaries. We restrict 
our sample to transactions in existing apartments. New properties and house 
sales both represent only a small share of the total sales for the Paris Region and 
their price and physical attributes strongly differ from those of the existing 
apartments. We collect individual information on the sale price, the floor area of 
the apartment, the floor level, the construction period of the building, the pres-
ence of an elevator in the building, the number of rooms, of bathrooms, of gar-
ages, etc. We also have the precise location (street address) of each housing 
unit. This is of crucial importance for the geographic mapping procedure of the 
data (i.e., the distinction of dwellings inside or beyond the EZ's boundaries and 
distance to the closest EZ boundary). Data are available for the 1996-2007 time 
period, on a monthly basis. 
We focus on sales occurring in the inner Paris département, one of the eight 
administrative units of the Paris Region. Nine ZUS have been created in inner 
Paris in January 1997 (see Figure 1). Table 1 summarizes some descriptive sta-
tistics of the main characteristics of people living in each of these nine zones. 
We compare these results to those obtained with a set of 8 control zones located 
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in the same area of inner Paris than the 9 treated ZUS (i.e., the North East of 
Paris). These control zones have been spatially delimited by another urban pro-
gram (CUCS, Contrat Urbains de Cohésion Sociale) that has been launched 
much later (in 2007) to implement joint actions (contract between the state and 
local governments) to improve the daily lives of residents in neighborhoods 
experiencing difficulties (unemployment, violence, etc.). Since they were creat-
ed according to a different program, these control zones did not receive the 
same public grants as ZUS in 1997. However, Table 1 shows that treated and 
control zones are not so different when considering the share of low income 
households, the share of households getting unemployment benefits or the ac-
tivity rate. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the share of tenants in the social 
housing sector is much higher in some ZUS than in control zones (98.1% in the 
HBM Aubervilliers EZ and 99.1% in the Porte de Montmartre EZ). In theory, 
the modelling should be developed to take into account for the possible bias 
implied by the endogeneity of the Round I selection process. In a similar 
framework, such a modelling did not allow the econometricians to exhibit the 
impact of a particular variable on the dependent one in the selection process 
(see Gregoir and Maury, 2014). 
Figure 1.  Map of Inner Paris 
 
Grey areas are Round I ZUSs (treated zones).  
Black areas are zones of the control group (CUCS). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on treated and control zones in Paris 
Name 
low 
income 
social 
housing 
unemp. 
benefits 
activity 
rate 
employees/ 
workers 
HBM Aubervilliers (T) 25.0 98.1 19.7 70.0 78.2 
HBM Ménilmontant (T) 14.5 46.1 17.6 75.4 46.1 
La Goutte d'Or (T) 25.5 18.6 22.1 74.8 61.5 
Porte Saint-Denis (T) 11.2 6.4 18.2 82.1 38.2 
Fontaine au Roi (T) 17.5 14.9 19.7 79.8 47.5 
Porte de Saint-Ouen (T) 15.6 61.5 17.5 77.7 64.0 
Porte de Montmartre (T) 23.0 99.1 19.4 69.2 78.8 
Curial (T) 16.8 59.1 20.4 77.0 63.1 
Belleville (T) 22.6 34.4 22.0 77.6 54.7 
Buisson Saint-Louis (C) 15.4 22.5 20.1 80.0 50.8 
La Chapelle hors ZUS (C) 19.3 20.9 19.3 75.7 61.5 
Amiraux Simplon (C) 15.1 14.1 18.7 78.0 55.6 
Curial hors ZUS (C) 21.2 47.3 19.5 75.6 60.9 
Amandiers hors ZUS (C) 15.5 37.9 21.0 78.8 48.8 
Porte de Saint-Denis hors 
ZUS (C) 
11.7 7.1 18.5 82.5 40.5 
Porte de Montmartre hors 
ZUS (C) 
20.0 80.4 19.7 71.5 69.9 
Porte de Saint-Ouen hors 
ZUS (C) 
15.6 63.0 17.9 77.6 64.5 
Paris Metropolitan Area 8.8 21.6 15.2 81.1 49.3 
9 treated (T) and 8 control (C) are considered. 'Low Income' is the share of low income 
households in 2009. 'Social Housing' is the share of tenants in a social dwelling in 
2009. 'Unemp. benefits' is the share of households where at least one member get 
unemployment benefits.  'Activity rate' is the activity rate among 25-64y in 2009. 
'Emp/workers' is the share of employees or workers in 2007. Source: INSEE. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
Let tcip ,,  be the log price of individual housing unit i, within (or in the vi-
cinity of) EZ c, at time t. We suppose that this outcome is generated by a semi-
parametric model of the form: 
   tciictcicicictcitci ZDITXp ,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,      (D.1) 
where cT is a treatment dummy variable (indicating whether or not the EZ c was 
treated in the Round I program in 1997). Hence, 1cT  is for the observations 
in the treated group and 0cT  in the control group. ciI ,  is a dummy variable 
indicating if housing unit i is located within (treated or the control) EZ c, and 
ciD , is the distance (as the crow flies) between housing unit i and the closest EZ 
border ( 0, ciD if 1, ciI ). tciX ,,  and tciZ ,,  both are vectors containing in-
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formation on the housing unit's characteristics, the EZ's characteristics and 
house market trends. We further discuss which variables should be included in 
the linear part of the model (i.e., included in vector X as done in traditional 
house price hedonic models) and which ones should be included as arguments 
of the unspecified function  . .   is the hedonic parameter vector. ic,  is a 
spatial location fixed effect. It captures unobserved local neighborhood charac-
teristics that may potentially be correlated with the treatment variable cT  or the 
variables summarizing the distance to the nearest EZ ( ciI ,  and ciD , ). 
The model is a partially linear semi-parametric model that encompasses the 
standard linear hedonic setup  tciX ,, . The link function  .  is not specified ex 
ante. This semi-parametric specification allows for a non-linear impact on 
house prices of some house attributes tciZ ,, , or the distance to the nearest EZ 
 cici DI ,, , , as well as their interaction with the treatment variable cT . For in-
stance, we expect home prices to be positively related to ciD , ,  but dependent 
on some of the apartment's attributes, its size for example: the immediate prox-
imity of an EZ may influence the price differently for large family dwellings 
(households with children) than for small apartments. We then include the 
dwelling's floor area variable among tciZ ,,  instead of tciX ,, . Furthermore, we 
do not know how the distance gradient may evolve after the new policy imple-
mentation. Consequently, the interaction between cT  and ciD ,  should not be 
specified ex ante (both are arguments of  . ). 
The estimation procedure is as follows. We first collect all pre-reform hous-
ing sales tcip ,,  ( 1997t ). Let n  denote the total number of such observations. 
To control for individual and local unobserved heterogeneity, each reference 
sale i is spatially matched with a fixed number ( n ) of post-reform housing sales 
tcijp ,,,  ( 1997t , nj ,...,1 ). Different values for the number of nearest 
neighbors are tested. The matching procedure is done according to the sole spa-
tial criterion (i.e. we gather the n  post-reform sales nearest to the pre-reform 
reference point i ). We then compute the housing price differential between 
transaction i and the counterfactual transactions j, i.e. 
tcitcjttcji ppp ,,,,,,,,   . All these nn  observations are pooled and 
weighted according to the distance between the focal and counterfactual sales. 
Let jiw ,  denote the weight between sales i and j. 1,,...,1
1
 

jinj wn  for each i. 
In our framework, each pair  ji,  shares the same fixed unobserved effect ic, . 
This is reasonable if the distance between i and j remains low. Accordingly, the 
housing price differential becomes 
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where we take advantage of the fact that cicj II ,,   (if the focal point is within 
an EZ's boundaries, the spatial matching procedure is done inside the EZ, no 
counterfactual sale is selected beyond the EZ boundaries and similarly if the 
focal point is outside the EZ) and 0,,  cicj DD  to reformulate the nonpara-
metric part of the model (second term in bracket in the RHS of preceding equa-
tion) 
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 (D.3) 
Such a general setup is subject to the curse of dimensionality due to the large 
number of covariates (arguments of function  ). We limit our approach to a 
partially linear single-index. The non-linear link function is then defined as 
   tcjtcicicicttcji ZZDITY   ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,  where  tcjtcicicicttcji ZZDITY   ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,  
and   is a parameter vector. This single-index assumption implies a lesser de-
gree of generality, since all interactions of elements of Y  are captured by the 
eventual non-linearity in the univariate function  . , but it may still capture 
important features of our high-dimensional problem and will greatly facilitate 
the numerical estimation procedure. Applications of the partially linear single-
index model may be found in various fields, including housing economics (see 
for example, Wang et al. (2007) who propose an application of this model to the 
case of Boston House prices, using a different setup). We implicitly assume that 
conditionally on the covariates, the growth in housing prices is not related to the 
treatment variable, ?,,,, ttcjip    cT   |    DIZX ,,,,  . 
Following Yu and Ruppert (2002), we model  .  with a penalized spline 
(P-spline hereafter). As detailed by Ruppert and Carroll (1997) or Ruppert 
(2002), P-splines are a generalization of smoothing splines allowing more flexi-
bility in the choice of knots and penalty parameters. Moreover, according to 
other methods with different link function specifications, P-splines allow for 
easier and faster regression procedures. For example, we have also estimated 
our setup with local linear approximations and the minimum average variance 
estimation (MAVE, see Xia and Härdle, 2006), but convergence was much less 
rapid. The P-spline function for   is: 
    pkkp
K
k
p
p aaaa 

  
1
10 ...  (D.4) 
                              Région et Développement       77 
where  K
kk 1
  are the spline knots. They capture the jumps in the thp  degree of 
the polynomial.  .,...,, 10 Kp   Following Yu and Ruppert (2002), the 
estimation is carried out with several numbers of knots ,K ( ,3K ,10,5  more 
than 10  knots is above the usual practice in applications). The knots are equally 
spaced along the quantiles of the index, ttcjiY ,,,, . We adopt the standard penal-
ized and weighted least squares estimators of  ,   and   which minimize: 
   
       


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ttcjitcitcjtcitcjji
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


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
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,,,,,,,,,,,,,
11
1
,,,
,,,
 (D.5) 
where D  is a positive semidefinite symmetric matrix. We select D  equal to a 
diagonal matrix with its last K  diagonal elements equal to 1  and the rest is 
zero (Ruppert and Carroll (1997)). We penalize the jumps in the P-spline. 0  
is the penalty parameter. Its value is chosen by a standard generalized cross-
validation (GCV) selection process which is simultaneously run with the non-
linear least squares estimation algorithm. The complete procedure (estimation 
  GCV) follows closely Yu and Ruppert (2002) approach. After selecting the 
size of the nearest-neighbors kernel ( n ), the polynomial degree ( p ), the num-
ber of knots ( K ), we obtain initial estimates for  ,  and   with OLS on a 
linear (fully parametric) version of the model. A grid of values for the penalty 
parameter ( ) is created and  .
,,, wnn
P  is first minimized over   (with OLS 
estimates of  ,  and  ) and then over   ,,,  for each value of  . A 
GCV score is computed for the selection of   (see equation 21 in Yu and Rup-
pert, 2002) and the estimation outcome with this value is finally chosen. 
5. RESULTS 
 
We present here the results of our P-spline partially linear single-index mod-
el. The chosen sample period is [1996; 1997]: i.e., we consider apartment sales 
one year before the EZ implementation (1996), and one year after (1997). We 
select the control group as explained in the data presentation section: 8 zones 
(CUCS) than have not been converted into ZUSs in 1997, but could have been 
according to their characteristics. We pool all pre-reform sales observations 
within or close to treated areas (i.e., ZUSs) and within or close to control group 
zones: close to is defined here as being within a 300 meter radius of the nearest 
EZ. 
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Table 2. Estimation. Inner Paris for the 1996 to 1997 period 
Hedonic Terms:  X  Estimates s.e. 
Level 1 (ref = ground level)  
0919.0    0113.0   
Level 2  
1308.0    0112.0   
Level 3  
1306.0    0111.0   
Level 4 with elev.  
2006.0    0108.0   
Level 4 no elev  
1403.0    0113.0   
2 rooms (ref = studio)  
0239.0    0082.0   
3 rooms  
0524.0    0119.0   
4 rooms  
0564.0    0160.0   
5+ rooms  
0636.0    0209.0   
Parking space (ref = no)  
0779.0    0112.0   
Bathroom (ref = no)  
1486.0    0057.0   
constr.    1969,1948  (ref<1948) 0255.0    0171.0   
constr.    1980,1970    0622.0    0178.0   
constr.   1981    1720.0    0253.0   
 2
nd
 quarter (ref = 
st1  )  0030.0    0071.0   
 3
rd
 quarter  0029.0    0072.0   
 4
th
 quarter  0037.0    0067.0  
Index parameters:    Estimates s.e. 
 cT    0081.0    0357.0   
 ciI ,     7201.0    3139.0   
 ciD ,    0015.0    0023.0   
 cic IT ,    6404.0    4070.0   
 cic DT ,    0030.0    0024.0   
 tciZ ,,  (log floor area reference)  2541.0    0107.0   
 tcjZ ,,  (log floor area counterfactual)  0822.0    00901.0   
P-spline parameters:    Estimates s.e. 
 0    
 1025.0    0123.0   
 1    
0564.0    0087.0   
 2  (jump)  
0890.0    0085.0   
 3  (jump)  0123.0    0095.0   
 4  (jump)  
0233.0    0092.0   
 5  (jump)  
 0382.0    0096.0   
 6  (jump)  
 0885.0    0095.0   
λ=0.0025, N=7,659. ∗∗ = 5% signif, ∗ = 10% signif.  
Standard errors are calculated with block-bootstrap procedures 
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We set 1p  (first degree P-spline polynomial part), as usually done in the 
literature. We set 3n  (results are qualitatively similar for other values of n ). 
Each pre-reform sale is then spatially matched with 3  post-reform counterfac-
tual sales. The whole sample size is 141,30 , which includes all differences in 
the log of house prices, p , between the pre-and post-reform periods. The 
benchmark control group chosen is also included. 
Vector tciX ,,  includes a large set of structural attributes for each dwelling: 
the floor level and presence of an elevator, the number of rooms, the presence 
of a parking space, a bathroom, the period of construction of the building, the 
year and quarter of transaction. The only covariate included in tciZ ,,  is the log 
of floor area (in square meters). This continuous variable allows us to capture 
interactions between the size of dwellings and the treatment effect. Finally, the 
list of variables used to constitute the index are: ,cT  the treatment dummy; ciI ,  
the within-EZ dummy; ciD ,  the distance (in hundreds of meters) to the nearest 
EZ boundary; tciZ ,,  the log of floor area of the pre-reform reference housing 
sale i ; and tcjZ ,,  the log of floor area of post-reform counterfactual housing 
sale j . 
We first conduct some preliminary estimates (obtained with standard para-
metric methods), in order to assess the relationship between the endogenous 
variable – the difference in the log of house prices ttcip  ,,,  – and the univariate 
index ttcjiY ,,,, . We then select the number of knots 5K . As suggested by 
Ruppert and Carroll (1997), the total number of knots should not exceed 10. In 
our case, additional knots do not appear to capture significant new locally-linear 
trends, in the relationship between the endogenous variable (controlling for the 
linear hedonic term) and the index. 
Table 2 gives estimates of model (differential). Results are reported for the 
three different sets of parameters:  , ,    and  . We emphasize that the 
estimates of the index parameter vector   should not be directly quantitatively 
interpreted, since they depend on the link function  . and its parameter esti-
mates. The parameter estimates for the standard hedonic part of the model: i.e., 
X , have the expected sign and magnitude. We put the emphasis on the results 
for the index  tcicicic ZDIT ,,,, ,,, . We detect no significant impact of the 
treatment dummy variable cT  on the dynamics of housing prices between 1996 
and 1997. Second, the impact of covariate  cic IT ,  on the price growth rate 
between the pre- and post-reform years is positive, though not significant. The 
magnitude of the impact of this covariate on home values cannot be directly 
assessed from the parameters estimates (since it depends on the parameters of 
the p-spline) and we obtain the ATT (Average Treatment Effect for the Treated) 
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with simulation methods (see Gregoir and Maury, 2014, for a detailed explana-
tion): we find that growth in home prices between 1996 and 1997 has been 
slightly more than 3 percentage points higher within treated areas, though once 
again this effect is non significant. Hence, we do not provide evidence of a posi-
tive incidence of the French Round I program on targeted EZ in inner Paris. 
Looking at the data, it seems that this outcome stems from the heterogeneity in 
home price dynamics between ZUS in Paris: some of them experienced price 
growth rates above the average of control zones between 1996 and 1997, while 
other treated zones did not. These differences in price evolution may be the 
consequence of uncontrolled factors in the benchmark model, but could also be 
linked to the voluntary nature of aids in first tier EZs (the local authorities can 
decide in each case to grant aid or not, and these aids will not be compensated 
by the state). Maybe we would have obtained different results with second or 
third tier zones (notice that there are only first tier zones in Paris), since tax 
abatements are mandatory for them. In a companion paper, Gregoir and Maury 
(2014), working with another administrative unit (the Seine-Saint-Denis dépar-
tement), conclude that the implementation of the Round II local development 
program in 2004 seems to have contributed negatively to the local value of the 
housing market, suggesting there has been a stigmatizing effect on areas that 
became ZFUs (i.e., third tier EZs). 
Finally, we detect no significant gap in home prices dynamics between hous-
ing units located inside a treated EZ ( 1, ciI  , 1cT ) and housing units located 
in their immediate vicinity ( 0, ciI , 0,1 ,  cic DT ). The positive impact of 
the  cic IT ,  covariate is dampened by the negative impact of the ciI ,  covari-
ate. On the contrary, price have grown less inside a non-treated (control) zone   
( 1, ciI , 0cT ) than in their immediate vicinity ( 0, ciI , 0,0 ,  cic DT ). 
We find no significant relationship between the distance to the closest EZ bor-
der )( ,ciD  and the growth rate of property values. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In a flexible semi-parametric framework, we analyze the impact of a particu-
lar EZ policy implemented in 1997 on real estate values within and in the vi-
cinity of nine areas in Paris inner city. Whereas such policies are designed to 
regenerate urban environment through incentives to conduct local amenities 
projects and financial aid to new homeowners, we do not detect any significant 
impact of this program on housing prices at any level in comparison with what 
has been observed in areas, similar from a social and economic descriptive 
point of view but not included in the program. This is at odd with the objectives 
of such policies and with the results obtained in a companion study on their 
impacts on suburb areas in which a significant negative impact was detected. 
This may be due to the heterogeneity of the selected areas, some may have been 
positively impacted by the policy and some negatively, or to the fact the policy 
was undersized. 
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LE MARCHÉ DU LOGEMENT PARISIEN ET                                             
LES ZONES URBAINES SENSIBLES  
 
Résumé - Nous estimons l’impact des zones franches sur le marché du logement 
parisien. En 1997, trois types de zones franches ont été mis en place (ZUS, ZRU 
and ZFU). En particulier, 9 zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS) ont été créées dans 
Paris intra-muros. Nous comparons l’évolution des prix des appartements dans 
ces zones à celle observée dans des zones voisines comparables. Nous propo-
sons une nouvelle méthode semi-paramétrique avec appariement géographique. 
Chaque vente observée avant la réforme est couplée à un ensemble de ventes 
observées après la mise en place de la réforme. Cette procédure d’appariement 
est effectuée pour des logements situés dans ou à proximité d’une ZUS. Nous ne 
détectons pas d’effet significatif de ce programme de zones franches sur les 
valeurs immobilières.  
 
Mots-clés - ZONES URBAINES SENSIBLES, PRIX DE L’IMMOBILIER, 
APPARIEMENT GÉOGRAPHIQUE 
 
